FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH INDEX

Published Weekly

Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.
Vol. XIV, No. 709

May 28-June 3, 1954

Week in Headline

United States

Security Board found atomic scientist Oppenheimer "loyal" but ruled against AEC reinstatement.

McCarthy in conflict with Eisenhower Admin. over appeal to Govt. employes to give him restricted data; Cohn testified at hearings.

House approved extension of Social Security coverage.

7 Connecticut CP leaders held

International

Indo-China cease-fire talks began at Geneva Conf.

UN Security Council took up Thailand warning on S.E. Asia.

East Pakistan Cabinet ousted for separatist plot.

5,000-yr.-old funeral bark of Pharaoh Cheops found in Egypt.

WORLD AFFAIRS

INDO-CHINA

Geneva Calls Truce Talks

Direct military talks on a Viet Namese cease-fire were ordered May 29 by the Geneva Conf. on Far Eastern Affairs. Representatives of the French & Viet Minh high commands began June 1 in Geneva to study the disposition of forces to be made after a truce, starting with regrouping areas in Viet Nam.

The talks were proposed May 29 by British Forgn. Secy. Anthony Eden in a secret session of the 9 nations conferring on Indo-China. French Forgn. Min. Georges Bidault had asked May 27 that military experts of both sides start work on the mechanics of a Viet Namese truce while the conference as a whole continued to discuss other aspects of the armistice.

Eden's proposal was accepted unanimously but with some reservations. The U.S., Laos & Cambodia agreed only on the basis that the status of Laos & Cambodia differed from Viet Nam—Laos & Cambodia having been invaded by foreign troops, with only Viet Nam in a state of civil war.

France reserved its right to return to the question of Laos & Cambodia. It said the problem of controls & guarantees must be solved in an overall agreement on Indo-China and military conferees must work for the purposes & aims of the conference as a whole.

A Russian spokesman later told the press that Soviet & Red Chinese delegates had sought bilateral truce talks since the conference began.[1]

Reds Urged as Cease-Fire Guards

The U.S. led opposition to a Soviet proposal May 31 that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan & India be named to supervise an Indo-Chinese armistice. Soviet Dep. Forgn. Min. Andrei A. Gromyko, backed by Red China & Viet Minh, argued that a similar commission (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden & Switzerland) had worked well in Korea.[2] U.S. State Undersecy. Walter Bedell Smith said representatives of Communist nations could not be neutral. He called for a more international & impartial commission. But Soviet Forgn. Min. Vyacheslav M. Molotov, returning to Geneva from a 3-day trip to Moscow, insisted June 2 it would be "very difficult" to reach an armistice unless the Reds held a firm place on the truce commission.[3]



Wide World

Triangle on map indicates vital defense area southeast of Hanoi cleared of Viet Minh rebels by 6,000 French Union troops May 29-31, according to French announcement. 18-day siege of Yen Phu (Yenphu) was lifted May 29. Black arrows signify rebel attacks June 1-3 on 200-man French garrison at Chonoi, where heavy French air support aided defenders.[4]

In Brief

Draft of 80,000 Frenchmen starting in June to replace Army regulars shifted to Indo-China from Germany & North Africa was approved by the French Cabinet May 28. The conscripts previously were scheduled to be called starting in November.[5] . . . **Thailand** asked formally May 29 that the UN Security Council consider sending a Peace Observation Com. mission to study the war danger in Southeast Asia. U.S. Amb.-to-UN Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Council chairman for June, accepted Thailand's request June 1 and the Council met in New York to study it June 3.[6] . . . **5-power staff talks** (U.S., France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand) on Southeast Asian defense problems opened June 3 in Washington.[7] . . . **Lt. Geneviève de Galard-Terraube**, French AF nurse who survived the siege of Dienbienphu, returned to Paris June 1.[8]

Pres. Eisenhower told his news conference June 2 he had not decided whether to ask Congress for authority to order armed intervention in Southeast Asia.[9] . . . **U.S. Defense Secy. Charles E. Wilson**, returning to Washington June 2 from a survey trip to Korea, Formosa, Hong Kong & the Philippines with Gen. James A. Van Fleet, said that the problem of halting Red expansion in the Far East was mostly political. He said Asians generally failed to realize the degree of Communist aggression in Indo-China.[10]

OTHER WORLD NEWS

Allies Firm on Korea

UN supervision of Korean elections under a peace agreement for that country was demanded by U.S. State Undersecy. Walter Bedell Smith in a speech May 28 to the Korean section of the Geneva Conf. He said it was essential that "authority & moral force of the UN" be upheld. "It is the only instrument left to us for ridding the world of the scourge of war." He indorsed South Korea's plan for all-Korea elections and rejected the Communist plan calling for a North-South Korean election commission "assisted" by neutral observers. Greece, Colombia, Thailand, Turkey & Australia also indorsed the ROK election plan.

(Thai Forgn. Min. Prince Wan Waithayakon suggested informally May 30 that the Geneva Conf. talks on Korea be broken off. He proposed that a commission composed of the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, Red China and North & South Korea take over the problem & report to the UN Gen. Assembly. A South Korean spokesman in Geneva said May 31 his Govt. was opposed to any peace negotiations with the Communists beyond

1—see p. 169B1 2—see p. 170E3 3—see p. 155B1 4—see p. 170D1, map p. 162 5—see p. 170F1 6—see p. 170A2 7—see p. 169E3 8—see p. 170A1 9—see p. 161E3 10—see p. 145F3 (See also Index for references)

FOF ADVISORY BOARD

Letters: Prof. A. J BARNOUW, Columbia
Medical Science: Dr. EDWARD C. BRENNER
Political Science: Prof. FRANCIS W. COKER, Yale
Economics: Prof. J. ANTON DE HAAS, Claremont
Science: DAVID DIETZ, Scripps-Howard Newspapers
Education: Dr. HARRY D. GIDEONSE, Pres. B'klyn Coll
History: JOHN GUNTHER
News Analysis: H. V. KALTENBORN
World Affairs: WILLIAM L. SHIRER
Law: Dr. FRANK HENRY SOMMERS, formerly N.Y.U.
Latin America: Prof. FRANK TANNENBAUM, Columbia
Library Service: Dr. C. C. WILLIAMSON, Columbia

PROPERTY OF LIBRARY OF THE 1954 SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

the current Geneva parley and would oppose referring back to the UN if the Geneva Conf. failed.)[1]

(The South Korean Govt. announced May 29 it had asked the U.S. for $300 million in military aid this fiscal year in addition to $231 million expected for rehabilitation.)[2]

Red Truce Breach Charged

A UN Command complaint Apr. 15 to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Comm. in Korea charged that the Reds had moved warplanes & other war equipment into North Korea in violation of the armistice, it was disclosed in Washington May 29. The U.S. Defense Dept. said Czech & Polish members of the NNSC had obstructed "disclosure & investigation of the military buildup in North Korea."[3]

•

Pakistan Prime Min. Mohammed Ali dismissed the 14-member provincial Cabinet of East Pakistan May 30, accused its chief minister, Fazlul Huq, 81, of "treasonable" efforts to make East Pakistan a separate independent state. Huq, whose anti-Moslem League coalition of 5 parties including the Communist won elections in April, had failed to check recent labor riots in which more than 600 persons were killed.[4] . . . **Jordan** withdrew May 28 from UN Security Council discussion of disorders in Palestine after Israel had demanded that Jordan commit itself to a peaceful settlement under terms prescribed by the UN Charter. (The U.S. disclosed June 1 that Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt & Lebanon had agreed to another conference with Eric Johnston, Pres. Eisenhower's special representative, on the U.S. plan for joint development of the Jordan River area.)[5]

European Defense Community plan was indorsed, 1,969-1,215, by a French Socialist Party congress May 30. The delegates then voted, 2,414-972, to instruct Socialist deputies in the Natl. Assembly to vote as a bloc for EDC ratification although 58 of 105 deputies (16% of the Assembly) were on record as opposed to it.[6] . . . **Japanese** Diet's upper house completed Parliamentary passage June 2 of bills to create (with U.S. aid) a "self-defense" force of 140,000 troops, 22,285 naval personnel & 6,287 airmen.[7]

Atomic control talks between the U.S. & Russia (in progress in London since May 19 in a UN Disarmament Subcom. composed of the U.S., Russia, Britain, France & Canada) "cannot bring any positive results unless the U.S. agrees to unconditional prohibition of atomic-hydrogen weapons," Moscow *Pravda* said May 29.[8] . . . **U.S. foreign aid** policy should be subjected to "a thorough Congressional reappraisal," Sens. Styles Bridges (R., N.H.) & Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), who toured West Europe in February as a special Senate subcommittee, reported May 29. They called for "hardheaded & experienced bargaining" in all foreign aid negotiations "so that practical benefit" will be realized by the U.S. They said it must be recognized that the U.S. was not a "bottomless pit" of financial aid to Allies and NATO must be made less "cumbersome & unwieldy" in order to act effectively in event of aggression.[9]

Honduras Govt. charged May 27 that foreign Communists, mostly Guatemalans, had infiltrated ranks of United Fruit workers on strike. Union leaders in La Lima ousted their Strike Com. secy. as a Red June 1.[8]

1—see p. 170B-E2 2—see pp. 27F1, 11F2 3—see p. 170E3 4—see p. 168D1 5—see p. 171B3; Vol. XIII, p. 383E1 6—see p. 112C1 7—see p. 147C3 8—see p. 168B1

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

OPPENHEIMER

Found 'Loyal' But a Risk

Attorneys for Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer disclosed June 1 that a special Atomic Energy Comm. panel had cleared him as "loyal" but decided, 2-1, against his reinstatement as an AEC consultant.

The decision against restoring his security clearance was a recommendation to the AEC, which was to make the final decision.

The scientist's attorneys—Lloyd K. Garrison & John W. Davis—said he had waived appeal to the AEC personnel Security Review Board and asked for "immediate consideration" of his case by the AEC. They challenged the "process of reasoning" by which the special Personnel Security Board found Oppenheimer "loyal" & "discreet" in safeguarding atomic secrets but recommended against his further clearance.

Board Unanimous on Loyalty

The special 3-man panel had held closed hearings & deliberations on Oppenheimer's case since suspension of his security clearance on Pres. Eisenhower's orders Dec. 22. It consisted of ex-Army Secy. Gordon Gray, now U. of North Carolina president (panel chairman), ex-Chrmn. Thomas A. Morgan of the Sperry Corp. & Dr. Ward V. Evans, chemistry professor at Loyola U., Chicago. Charges considered were that Oppenheimer, head of the wartime Los Alamos A-bomb project & a leading postwar consultant to the AEC, was a security risk by reason of long association with Communists.

The board found unanimously that Oppenheimer was a "loyal citizen" who "seems to have had a high degree of discretion reflecting an unusual ability to keep to himself vital secrets." It said he had associated with & hired Communists and contributed to their causes from late 1936 or early 1937 until Apr. 1942, and in "a diluted & diminishing state" until 1946. It said Oppenheimer acknowledged this, charging it to errors of judgment.

The board also found that Oppenheimer, although opposed on moral, strategic, political & technical grounds to launching the hydrogen bomb project in 1949, did nothing to frustrate it after Pres. Truman ordered the bomb's production in Jan. 1950.

Disagreement on Security

Gray & Morgan voted against Evans in the 2-1 recommendation that suspension of Oppenheimer's AEC security clearance be maintained. Gray & Morgan held: The scientist's "continuing conduct & associations have reflected a serious disregard for the requirements of the security system"; he had evidenced a "susceptibility to influence which could have serious implications for the security interests of the country"; his conduct toward the H-bomb project raised "doubt as to whether his participation, if characterized by the same attitudes in a Govt. program relating to the national defense, would be clearly consistent with the best interests of security"; while not opposing the H-bomb program after the President ordered it, he gave it no "enthusiastic" support and this influenced the attitude of other scientists toward it; he "seems to have been an active fellow traveller" at one time; he was "less than candid in several instances in his testimony before this board."

Gray & Morgan, pointing out that "any doubts whatsoever must be resolved in favor of the national security" under existing security regulations, concluded that they held some "reasonable doubts" as to Oppenheimer's reliability & "therefore do not recommend reinstatement of clearance." They were precluded, they said, from making "concessions for reasons of admiration, gratitude, reward, sympathy or charity."

Evans said in his dissenting opinion: there had been no new charges posted against Oppenheimer since his security clearance in 1947 and even persons testifying against him had not accused him of disloyalty; he was less of a security risk now & his judgment was better than in 1947; he "did not hinder" development of the H-bomb; he "hates Russia" despite friendship with some Communists and had done a "thorough & painstaking" job of fulfilling Govt. assignments. "To damn him now and ruin his career & his service, I cannot do it," Evans declared.

Evans wrote that he was "worried about the effect an improper decision may have on the scientific development in our country." (The executive committee of the Fed. of Amer. Scientists called the finding against Oppenheimer "unfair" June 3 and said it illustrated the "bitter fruits of a security system . . . motivated more by the risks of politics than the risks of disclosure of information.") Dr. Evans' dissenting opinion pointed out

FACTS ON FILE is published weekly by Facts on File, Inc., 516 Fifth Ave., New York 36, N. Y. (MUrray Hill 2-5523-4). Entered as 2d class matter June 24, 1941 at the Post Office in New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription $55 a year; Yearbooks (bound volumes) from 1941—$25 each. Cumulative Index published twice a month. Copyright 1954 by Facts on File, Inc. Edw. Van Westerborg, Pres.-Treas.; Fred McGhee, Secy.-Editor; C. M. Schwartz, Business Manager.

that witnesses defending Oppenheimer "are a considerable segment of the scientific backbone of our nation."[1]

●

McCARTHY-ARMY DISPUTE

New Clash Over Govt. Secrets

More dispute between Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wis.) & the White House over the Senator's right to get restricted data from Executive Branch informants arose from hearings into the McCarthy-Cohn conflict with Army Secy. Robert T. Stevens & Army Counselor John G. Adams.

Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel to McCarthy's investigating committee, took the stand May 28 as his side's first witness in the hearings. He was still under cross-examination June 3. [See summary of testimony May 27-28 & June 1 beginning col. 2 this page]

Senator Calls for Informants

McCarthy renewed May 27-28 his call, on promise that he would shield their identity, for persons in the Executive Branch to ignore a "bureaucrat's" stamp of secrecy & report to him on Communist infiltration or other wrong-doing. The Senator held that this was (1) a patriotic duty transcending loyalty to executive orders and (2) within the mandate of his committee to investigate Executive Branch performance. He became involved in sharp dispute with subcommittee Democrats (Sens. McClellan, Symington, Jackson). [See col. 3]

Eisenhower Assails 'Demagogues'

Pres. Eisenhower, who indorsed a statement by Atty. Gen. Brownell May 28 challenging McCarthy's bid for informants [see col. 3], delivered May 31 what was generally regarded as an implied denunciation of the Senator. The President said in addressing a Columbia U. bicentennial dinner in New York: Amid existing "alarms & uncertainties, doubters begin to lose faith in themselves, in their convictions. . . . Through knowledge & understanding, we will drive from the temple of freedom all who seek to establish over us thought control—whether they be agents of a foreign state or demagogues thirsty for personal power & public notice."[2]

The President refused at his news conference June 2 to answer questions about McCarthy, saying he intended to stress his legislative program. But he issued a statement praising the Justice Dept. & FBI for "constant surveillance of Communists" on a "24-hour, 7-days-a-week, 52-weeks-a-year" basis "in conformance with due process of law . . . quietly & relentlessly." He said this had resulted during his Admin. in: one conviction for treason, 2 for espionage, 41 for illegal Communist Party leadership, 8 for false statements to the Govt.; 21 other indictments & 7 other arrests of CP leaders; deportation of 84 alien subversives & proceedings against 282 others (alien & naturalized); barring of 127 subversive aliens at ports of entry.[3]

Summary of Hearings on McCarthy-Army Dispute

(Public Proceedings of Senate Permanent Subcom. on Investigations; sessions held in Caucus Room of Senate Office Bldg., Washington)

22d Day—May 27

Cohn Tells His Side of Story

Cohn, permanent chief counsel of the subcommittee, testified as the McCarthy side's first witness. Under questioning by Jenkins, special subcommittee counsel, Cohn said:

The McCarthy side accused Army Secy. Stevens & Army Counselor Adams of: (1) trying to discredit the McCarthy Com.'s work; (2) trying to prevent or discontinue its investigation of spies, subversives & poor security risks in the Army & particularly at Ft. Monmouth; (3) successfully preventing the committee from investigating Loyalty Board members.[4]

The McCarthy side "did not make charges" against Stevens & Adams but merely "gave an answer" to Stevens' & Adams' charges. The McCarthy Com. never investigated the Army "as such" but investigated Communists who infiltrated the Army and "the people . . . who have covered [it] up."

Probe Began in Early 1953

Cohn testified that in about Feb. 1953 the McCarthy Com. began investigating the "historically-known fact" that the Communists sought to infiltrate the Army "and had succeeded to some extent." In Mar. 1953, Cohn said, the committee received from people "formerly . . . in the Communist movement specific details about what the Communist conspiracy had done to infiltrate the . . . Army & to place Communists in [the Army's] key . . . sensitive places." This data was in a memo entitled *Communist Infiltration of the American Armed Forces.*

Cohn said he thought it would be all right to file the 1953 memo with the committee but that he would consult with McCarthy first. Sen. McClellan ascertained that it was a committee document and insisted that the committee also be consulted.

McCarthy then obtained a 2-minute recess during which he & Cohn phoned and received "permission" of Paul Crouch, Immigration Svc. consultant who prepared the memo, to submit it.*

McClellan & McCarthy Clash

Cohn said under McClellan's questioning that he was "sure" Crouch's memo had been available to committee members in the files. McCarthy added that all data in committee files were open to committee members.

McClellan retorted that he had asked for but not received names of "the claimed 130 Communists" McCarthy had said repeatedly were ready to be exposed. McCarthy said this was because he was "tied up here day & night" with the current hearings.[5]

McCarthy said he would withhold data "which would disclose confidential informants" because he understood McClellan had said he "would not hesitate to make known the names of informants." But McCarthy said he would give committee members any other information. McClellan denied saying he would reveal informants.

McCarthy said that McClellan, discussing McCarthy's receipt of confidential FBI information, had been quoted to the effect that he "thought perhaps not only the man who gave this information . . . but also Sen. McCarthy might be guilty of a crime."[6]

McClellan replied: "I repeat that. . . . I do not believe you can receive information that is obtained by criminal means and hold it in your possession without the probability of you too being guilty of crime."

McCarthy Invites Informants

McCarthy said, "I would like to notify [the] 2 million federal employes that I feel it's their duty to give us any information which they have about graft, corruption, Communists, treason, and that there is no loyalty to a superior officer which can tower above & beyond their loyalty to their country."

McCarthy, amplifying his views, said: ". . . I think that the oath which every person in Govt. takes to protect & defend this country against all enemies—foreign & domestic—that oath towers far above any Presidential secrecy directive. . . .

Views on Security Orders

Statement by Atty. Gen. Brownell at the White House May 28 with the President's approval: "The Exec. Branch . . . has the sole & fundamental responsibility under the Constitution for the enforcement of our laws & Presidential orders. . . . That responsibility cannot be usurped by any individual who may seek to set himself above the laws of our land or to override orders of the President of the U.S. to Federal employes of the Executive Branch. . . ."

Senate Majority Leader Knowland May 29: Exec. Branch officials would be "on highly dangerous & doubtful ground" to "violate the law or their orders to turn over security information" directly to Congress.

Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R., N.J.) May 29: McCarthy's plea to Exec. employes to defy their orders was "beyond belief." "We cannot tolerate one-man government either in the executive or legislative bodies."

Sen. Mundt (R., S.D.), chairman of the McCarthy-Army hearings: Most Congressional investigations of the Executive started from leaks of classified information. "If I were Pres. Eisenhower or Brownell, I'd do everything I could to stop it. I'm down here [in Congress] and I do all I can to get it. That's the way you play the game."

*Atty. Gen. Brownell told reporters May 27 the Justice Dept. was investigating columnist Joseph Alsop's allegations that Crouch gave contradictory testimony at 2 trials: Crouch said at Harry Bridges' trial in 1949 he did not know Communist official David Davis; but Crouch testified at the recent trial of Red leaders in Philadelphia that he had had numerous contacts with Davis. [See p. 93C-E2; Vol. XII, 331C; IX, 413E-F] 1—see p. 141F3 2—pp. 163G2-D3, 164B1 3—pp. 151D2, 121B3 4—p. 136C1 5—p. 158C2 6—pp. 155F2, 166G3-167A1

I will continue to receive information such as I received the other day. In view of Sen. McClellan's statement that he feels that it's a crime for someone to give me information about traitors in Govt., I am duty bound not to give the Senator the names of those informants. . . . That will be my policy. There's no power on earth can change that. . . . I want to compliment the individuals who have placed their oath to defend the country against enemies—and certainly Communists are enemies—above & beyond any Presidential directive. . . . None of them will be brought before a grand jury because of any information which I give. . . . If any Admin. wants to indict me for receiving & giving the American people the information about communism, they can just go right ahead and do the indicting."

McClellan warned that "if this principle is adopted . . . you have no security system in America. It will destroy totally & irrevocably if all who have information give it out indiscriminately." "I don't know of any oath [of office] that required [anybody] to commit a crime."

Sen. Symington, as ex-Air Force Secy., warned against the idea that everybody in the services who had a "grudge" against or who thought he was wiser than his superiors could decide to give away secrets. "No man who takes an oath of office not to divulge secrets has the right to decide to do it," he said.

Cohn's Testimony

Cohn resumed after the dispute. Substance of his testimony:

Background. The McCarthy Com. conducted preparatory investigations of the Army for 2 to 4 months in early 1953 without informing Stevens. It found "that pro-Communist literature had been in use by Army Intelligence and was still in use in some cases." It heard allegations of "people following the Communist line teaching at various Army institutions." "We found that a directive had been issued in 1944 permitting and perhaps, in the interpretation of many, even encouraging the commissioning of Communists." "A number of Communists had been commissioned. . . . Some of them were still in the Army. . . . Some had been commissioned in fairly recent years." Communists, people with Communist records & security risks had infiltrated Army civilian personnel, particularly at the Monmouth radar laboratories. Executive hearings, generally presided over by McCarthy alone, began in Aug. 1953.

Monmouth. The investigation was concentrated on Monmouth as a result of material produced in the preparatory phase. Cohn believed that the 35 Monmouth suspensions were a result of the committee's work. The committee heard that "a large number of people with Communist affiliations & with connections with Communist spies . . . were still in 1953 working [at Monmouth radar laboratories] in spite of the fact that for a period of years" the FBI had warned the Army.

Jailed atomic spy David Greenglass told Cohn, Schine & others at Lewisburg Penitentiary Oct. 29: The ring headed by executed atomic spy Julius Rosenberg "obtained secrets from the Army Signal Corps and transmitted them to Russia. . . . Rosenberg [also] told me that while he was employed for the Signal Corps at Emerson [Radio Corp.] he stole the proximity fuse and gave it to the Russians. . . . As far as I know, these operations . . . could very possibly be continuing."

Cohn told Stevens Nov. 6 that Rosenberg & "probably a majority of members of the Rosenberg spy ring had . . . worked at the Army Signal Corps & specifically down at Ft. Monmouth. . . . Friends & associates [of Rosenberg & spy ring members] had still been at Monmouth in the year 1953. . . . A group of them had moved . . . into the Fed. Telecommunications Laboratory, which was a [private] company doing subcontracting work for the Army Signal Corps & Ft. Monmouth."

Coleman. Aaron Coleman, Rosenberg's "friend & associate," was found working at Monmouth in the spring of 1953 [Cohn testified]. Coleman admitted that Rosenberg had taken him to a Young Communist League meeting, but he denied ever having been a member. [He also said he had not seen Rosenberg since they left CCNY in 1939.][1] Ex-YCL member Nathan Sussman "named Coleman under oath as a [YCL] member . . . in the same cell with Julius Rosenberg & other people who have been found to be spies & Russian espionage agents."

The committee learned that in 1946 Coleman had been caught taking secret documents from the Monmouth radar laboratories, that 43 classified radar documents were found in his home. Coleman was suspended for 10 days in 1946, was then reinstated and was suspended again in 1953 after the McCarthy Com. investigated.[2]

Committee staff members went to Monmouth Oct. 3 or 4 and examined Coleman's personnel file. They copied down material relating to the removal of the documents. They asked to borrow the file and were told that they could not but that the Army would supply photostats. Adams gave them a "purported" photostat of the file about Oct. 13, and McCarthy & Cohn used it to interrogate Coleman Oct. 14. They then found that the part relating to the removal of the documents was missing. They complained that the file had been "stripped," and Adams indicated later to Cohn that "it had not been done with his consent" or at his direction. It was removed because the material "could be construed as . . . loyalty-security information," therefore might not belong in the personnel file.[3]

Lawton. Maj. Gen. Lawton, Monmouth commander, told the McCarthy Com. Oct. 14 that he had "been trying for years, but it is only the last 2 or 3 weeks that I have been able to do something" about alleged security risks [according to Cohn]. Lawton said the suspensions were "due to the action of the subcommittee" and he "had received cooperation from his superior only when Sen. McCarthy & his subcommittee entered the field." McCarthy pressed Lawton on why this was so, and Lawton finally said, in effect, "I could tell you but . . . I work for Mr. Stevens and I had better not."

Adams told Cohn that Lawton "talked too much," had put Stevens "on the spot." From then on, Adams was angry at Lawton. When Lawton wanted to accompany McCarthy staff members to the Oct. 29 interview with Greenglass,[4] Adams prevented him from going or sending a representative. Adams was unhappy about Lawton's presence at McCarthy Com. hearings and told Cohn he would have Lawton "told . . . to start keeping his nose out of things."

Lawton thought he might "get in trouble if he allowed us to continue interviewing . . . people who worked at Ft. Monmouth." Cohn reported this to Stevens. Stevens then told Lawton "that those interviews could be conducted, and they were."

Adams told Cohn Nov. 24 that Stevens "had made concrete plans to remove Gen. Lawton [and] hoped to be able to do so the next day, but that he first wanted Mr. Adams [to see if] McCarthy would make a public issue out of it." Adams discussed this with McCarthy that night & next day. McCarthy said that removing Lawton would be "very unfortunate," that Army people would realize "that a great general was being punished for cooperating with a committee investigation . . . to oust Communists."

McCarthy told Cohn Dec. 17 that Adams "was at it again . . . was pressing the Senator for a promise of silence if Gen. Lawton were removed." McCarthy said Adams had told him Dec. 16 that "there was a new target date [Jan. 1] set by Mr. Stevens for removing Gen. Lawton. . . ." Adams confirmed this at luncheon in New York Dec. 17 and said that a "successor" to Lawton had been picked.

McCarthy told Cohn later that he was going to tell Lawton "that he would stand behind him." McCarthy directed Cohn to tell Lawton or his aide, Capt. (then Lt.) Joseph Edward Corr, what Stevens & Adams planned "to do to" Lawton. Cohn did so that night.[5]

Loyalty Board. McCarthy "made it publicly clear" as early as Sept. 2, 1953 "that he intended to call before the subcommittee members of the Loyalty Board" [Cohn testified].

McCarthy stressed to Stevens & Adams Oct. 13 & Nov. 6 the importance of exposing "the people who had allowed these Communists & security risks to stay" in Army jobs.

The McCarthy Com. Dec. 16 questioned Samuel Snyder, who had been cleared by a Loyalty Board. Snyder invoked the 5th Amend. McCarthy demanded names of Loyalty Board members who had cleared Snyder. Snyder's attorney gave McCarthy some names, promised the rest.

McCarthy told Adams that he would summon "people connected with this Loyalty Board & clearance process" after the committee filed its annual report. Adams "was very much disturbed by that." Adams was advised later that some Loyalty Board members would be called in the last half of January. Adams told Cohn & Carr Jan. 14 "there were elements of personal embarrassment connected with himself & Mr. Stevens."[6]

1—see Vol. XIII, p. 414C1 2—XIII, 341F1
3—p. 150B1 4—184G1 5—166C3 6—166E3

Opposition to Probe. Cohn first met Stevens in Sept. 1953. He told Stevens Sept. 16, at the N.Y. apartment of Schine's parents, that the investigation was being directed to Monmouth. Stevens did not indicate then, nor at their next meeting Sept. 21, that he opposed this.

Adams, whom Cohn had met a few days before Adams' appointment Oct. 1 as Army counselor, became very friendly with the McCarthy Com. staff and "made it clear" in early October that he wanted to avoid the hearings. Adams indicated indirectly it would help "solidify" him in his job if he & Stevens were allowed to "do the job." Adams continued such suggestions for months.

McCarthy, called back from his honeymoon by Cohn, presided Oct. 13 at hearings attended by Stevens & Adams. They raised with McCarthy the question of halting the hearings and letting the Army finish the job. Cohn attached "no special significance" to this because most agencies want investigations ended quickly.

Adams, in an Oct. 19 phone call, told Cohn he was preparing a press release which he wanted McCarthy to issue at Monmouth Oct. 20. In it, McCarthy was to say "that this subcommittee was going to bow out of the investigation . . . and leave it to Mr. Stevens & Mr. Adams." McCarthy replied that he planned to continue hearings. Adams then sent Cohn an amended draft statement saying McCarthy would hold such hearings.

In the plane en route to Monmouth Oct. 20, Adams urged McCarthy without success to issue the statement. Later, at Monmouth, McCarthy & Cohn found mimeographed statements in which Adams apparently had struck out things McCarthy had rejected. McCarthy refused to release them.[1]

A Nov. 6 luncheon in Stevens' office "was arranged by Mr. Adams" at Stevens' request to give them "one more crack" at McCarthy before the Monmouth hearings. McCarthy refused to call off the hearings. Stevens told McCarthy, in effect: "If you go through with . . . these public hearings and if you go into this loyalty set-up & everything else, I will have to resign as Secy. . . . A lot of the people involved have been serving under me and it's my responsibility. . . ."

Navy-AF Proposal. Adams suggested to Cohn & Carr Oct. 21, "as he had to another staff member once before [&] to us on subsequent occasions . . . that if we could . . . include other parts of the military such as the Navy & the Air Force [in the investigation] it would not look so bad for the . . . Army." Neither Adams nor Stevens "ever suggested that we pursue any false information" about the Navy & AF.

Stevens suggested at the Nov. 6 luncheon that "we . . . look at Communist infiltration in the Navy & the Air Force for a while and give the Army a rest." He indicated that "he could help us to get the information on the Navy & the Air Force." McCarthy replied that he had "no facts warranting such an investigation" and that the next inquiry would be into "Communist infiltration in defense plants." Stevens & Adams said "that that might involve the Defense Dept. itself" and "be very helpful . . . because it would remove the Army as the sole object. . . ."

Adams, talking to Cohn in Carr's presence Dec. 9, drew a map of the U.S. divided into 9 or 10 areas and said: "Mark . . . the location of the Army place which you're going to investigate next and I'm going to mark down the location of an Air Force base where there are a large number of sex deviates." No "trade" was made. "If there was anything he should have known about . . . [we] would have been glad to tell him about it."[2]

Schine. Adams invited McCarthy, Cohn, Carr & Schine to the Nov. 6 luncheon in Stevens' office. When McCarthy, Cohn & Carr appeared, Stevens asked whether Schine was coming [Cohn testified], saying that "a couple of photographers at the Pentagon had wanted a picture of him, the Secy., with Dave, who had just been inducted and [Stevens] had told them that he . . . thought the picture could be taken" at lunch.[3]

When McCarthy, Stevens & Cohn went to Maguire Air Base to see Schine Nov. 17, Stevens called Schine "over to his side. . . . They were taking pictures and Mr. Stevens made a comment about being glad to get a picture of himself & Pvt. Schine. . . . I heard no remarks Mr. Stevens addressed particularly to the photographer or anyone else."[4]

Adams referred to Schine as the "hostage" "more frequently than he called him by the name of Schine."[5]

Adams told Cohn & Carr Jan. 14 that the committee staff was not cooperating with him "and that he was going to show some . . . noncooperation too. And how would we like it if Schine were ordered overseas." "We made it clear we didn't care whether he went overseas. . . ."[6]

'Blackmail' Charge. McCarthy told Cohn Jan. 22 that Adams had visited him and was "trying to pull . . . 'a neat little trick of blackmail' "—"unless we killed the investigation there would be spread around [an embarrassing] report about me [Cohn]."[7]

Because of Adams' actions, Cohn decided "that I cared to have nothing more to do with" him. Adams phoned Feb. 12 and asked why Cohn was "ducking" him. Cohn said it was "because I believed that he had been thoroughly dishonest," had made a "blackmail threat" about "an untrue report." Adams said "he had a job to do" & must "stop at nothing to see that the investigation was killed."[8]

●

23d Day—May 28

Carr Offers to Testify

Mundt read a letter from McCarthy denouncing Stevens' & Adams' "vicious & completely unfounded attacks" on subcommittee staff director Carr. It said Carr felt he had been cleared by the subcommittee but he wanted to testify if any principal or committee member wanted to quiz him.[9]

Cohn on Peress Case

Cohn, under Jenkins' questioning, gave this account of the Peress case:

Cohn told Adams in early Dec. 1953 that Communists then held Army commissions. Adams said this "was completely untrue. . . . Not a single Communist . . . held a commission in the Army." Cohn named Irving Peress, a dentist, as a commissioned Communist. Adams checked and said a few days later that he was "taking action on the Peress case." McCarthy suggested giving Adams a month or 6 weeks to "get rid of Peress."

Cohn mentioned the matter several times to Adams and, starting about mid-January, McCarthy started to question Cohn about it. McCarthy finally "said he had waited long enough" and wanted Peress subpenaed. Peress appeared at an executive session in New York Jan. 30. Adams or an Army representative was invited but none came.

Cohn Won Name as Star Prosecutor Despite Youth

Roy Marcus Cohn, 27, Democrat, was under age for admission to bar on graduation from Columbia Law School (N.Y.) at 19. Worked as clerk to U.S. Dist. Atty. John F. X. McGohey in N.Y. until day of admission to bar (May 27, 1948) when he became Asst. U.S. Atty. Quickly acquired reputation as outstanding prosecutor despite youth. Helped prosecute major & "2d string" U.S. Communist Party leaders, Wm. Remington, atomic spies Julius & Ethel Rosenberg.

Wide World
ROY M. COHN

Confidential Asst. to U.S. Attys. Irving H. Saypol, Miles J. Lane in N.Y. 1950-52. Special assistant to U.S. Atty. Gen. James P. McGranery Sept. 1952 until appointment as McCarthy Subcom.'s chief counsel ($11,700 a yr.) Feb. 1953.

Son of Justice Albert Cohn of N.Y. State Supreme Court Appellate Division. Failed physicals after 2 nominations to West Point during World War II. Natl. Guardsman since 1948 (present rank: first lieutenant). Unmarried. Has lectured on criminal law at New York Law School. Partner in N.Y. law firm of (Thos. J.) Curran, (Francis J.) Mahoney, Cohn & (Menahem) Stim.

1—see p. 164E1 2—pp. 164E2, 165G3 3—p. 158C3 4—p. 158G3 5—p. 165C1 6—p. 159C2 7—p. 159A3 8—pp. 165F3, 159F3 9—p. 174B2

[Cohn's testimony continued]:

At the hearing, Peress "invoked the 5th Amend. to just about everything." Despite this, the subcommittee learned that when Peress was commissioned (as a captain), he "had an open record as a Communist." "He claimed the 5th Amend." when the Army "questioned him about his Communist activities" in August. "They promoted him to . . . major" afterwards.

McCarthy about Feb. 1 sent a letter to Stevens, then in the Far East, and demanded court-martial of Peress and "action . . . against all of those responsible for commissioning . . . & promoting" him. Adams replied in Stevens' absence with "a very long letter" which "said nothing" and did not supply, as requested, names of those responsible for commissioning & promoting Peress and canceling his overseas orders. [Welch later pointed out that Stevens recently had sent the names to Jenkins.][1]

Carr "earnestly asked Mr. Adams not to allow an honorable discharge" of Peress, but Peress was honorably discharged Feb. 2. McCarthy phoned Adams Feb. 2 or 3 and told him he (Adams) "was directly responsible for failure to delay the honorable discharge despite open & public warning" by McCarthy.

Zwicker Ended Cooperation

Brig. Gen. Zwicker, commander at Camp Kilmer, N.J. where Peress had been stationed, had been "cooperative" with a McCarthy Com. staff member and had given "a lot of important facts" about Peress [Cohn continued]. But Zwicker, before the subcommittee Feb. 18, with Adams beside him, "just didn't give any answers" to the "same questions."

McCarthy concluded that Adams "had told [witnesses] to keep quiet and not to give the committee the information." Cohn, on Carr's suggestion, phoned Adams later and proposed that they avoid questioning "people like Gen. Zwicker and get instead the person who had given . . . the orders to keep quiet."[2]

McCarthy's Data Subpenaed

McCarthy announced in the hearing that he was asking Mundt to sign a subpena ordering Stevens "to produce all files containing material relating to the Army charges of Mar. 11, Ft. Monmouth," the Peress case & "proposed removal" of Lawton.

It developed that McCarthy had just accepted a subpena, issued by Mundt on Jenkins' advice, calling for all material on which Schine had worked before & after induction. Cohn estimated that this involved "¾ of all of our files." He agreed to work on it over Memorial Day weekend & try to produce the material June 1.

McCarthy said he "would not allow" the subcommittee's Democrats to examine the files because McClellan allegedly had threatened to expose McCarthy's informants and the Democrats "apparently . . . thought that I should be prosecuted . . . " & "jailed."

Expanding on this, McCarthy said: He had "instructed a vast number of [Executive] employes that they were duty-bound to give me information even though some little bureaucrat had stamped it 'Secret' to protect himself."[3] If somebody in the Executive Branch had not given Mundt information on Alger Hiss, Hiss "might well now be an Asst. Secy. of State." He wanted the subcommittee to take up "a very serious problem"—the fact that the Democrats "think apparently the criminals are those who give us information about crime rather than the guilty party." He was willing to give Mundt any information Mundt wanted, but the Democrats would "not get the names of the loyal Govt. employes who gave us the evidence of treason that has been growing over the past 20, 21 years, . . ." [McCarthy's increasing of the "treason" period from 20 years to 21 was interpreted by some observers as a lumping of the Eisenhower Admin. with Democratic Admins. McCarthy had attacked.][4]

He agreed with a contention, in a statement issued by Atty. Gen. Brownell at the White House, that the Executive Branch "has the responsibility to enforce the law."[5] But the Congressional Reorg. Act required the Senate Govt. Operations Com. "to investigate graft, corruption, dishonesty & inefficiency . . . in the Executive Branch."*

Democrats Reject Views

Jackson (D.) retorted: He had "not said that [McCarthy] has violated the law. . . . That's the responsibility of . . . the Executive Branch." Brownell & FBI Dir. Hoover had called it "a violation of law" for a Govt. employe "entrusted with classified & secret information to give it to one not entitled" to it; "I do not believe that you can have any kind of security system . . . if we . . . place a subjective test on whether an individual can determine whether a certain document can be [given] to one not entitled" to it.

Symington (D.) insisted that he had said nothing about "jailing" McCarthy. He declared: The Democrats returned to the subcommittee last year with the understanding that decisions would be made by the majority; yet McCarthy said "on his own without any committee vote he had decided . . . to withhold [Jenkins'] relatively simple request . . . [for] these files"; Symington was "a little astonished at the amount of defense the Admin. gets from the Democratic Senators and the abysmal silence from my right."

Mundt indicated that he & McCarthy had agreed he would get all McCarthy's information but that Mundt would protect informants.

Cohn Cross-Examined

Jenkins switched from direct to cross-examination and drew from Cohn this testimony:

Need for Schine. Cohn met Schine 2 years ago. They became close friends. Schine, pres. & gen. mgr. of the Schine Hotel Corp., joined the McCarthy Com. "as an unpaid consultant" 2 or 3 weeks after Cohn became chief counsel in Jan. 1953. Schine's first committee job was on investigation of the U.S. information program & the Voice of America, "matters to which Dave had given a number of years' study & writing." Schine, usually alone, interviewed "hundreds of witnesses," checked their facts, "obtained documentation" and helped set up hearings.

The committee knew before July 8, 1953 that Schine was likely to be drafted. The committee took "steps" to wind up Schine's work. Schine worked on "preliminary investigations of the Army, of another . . . Govt. intelligence [unit], not the FBI, [on] possible delay in the development of the hydrogen bomb, possible Communist connections on the part of persons concerned with" A-bomb & H-bomb development and on UN & UNESCO investigations.

Schine did committee work during his passes from Ft. Dix and did not go to Florida at any time when he was released for committee work. After induction, Schine worked on "the 3 interim reports of the subcommittee, namely, engineering projects, information centers & Voice of America proper plus those sections of the annual report." Cohn was willing to produce these papers together with his "sworn statement" that Schine wrote "substantial portions of them."

McCarthy had asked the committee's research director to draft a report on the information program investigation. McCarthy found the research director's effort "not satisfactory." The research director said the report should be drafted by Schine, "who had done the work on that investigation." Schine "took over that job and he did it in substantial part."

Commission for Schine. McCarthy & Cohn asked Maj. Gen. Reber whether Schine's qualifications entitled him to a commission [Cohn testified]. They did not solicit aid in getting a commission, as Reber had testified. Reber's testimony that Cohn had called him an average of twice a day about Schine's commission July 8-31 was an overestimate. Cohn might have talked to Reber "5 or 6 times," and his secretary might have phoned Reber several times without getting him. Reber at first was "sure" Schine could get a commission but later indicated "there had been a change."[6]

Cohn differed with State Undersecy. Walter Bedell Smith's testimony that Cohn had told him "Army authorities had not been cooperative; that Gen. Reber had promised to arrange a commission . . . and had not done so; that I [Smith] knew all the senior officers in the Pentagon and would know who to talk to."

Cohn's version: Smith knew Schine & his family "& his qualifications." Smith called Cohn's office about something else, and Cohn mentioned the matter. Smith invited Cohn to visit him, and Cohn went. Cohn told Smith that Reber had said "there could be no doubt [Schine] was entitled to a commission" on his "merits & qualifications" but "afterward he retreated from that original statement." Cohn told Smith that McCarthy had heard that Reber might have "hard feelings" because of Cohn's & Schine's "unpleasant experience" with Reber's brother. Smith knew the Army people, and Cohn asked him to find out whether, in view of this, Schine's application "had been given a fair shake."[7]

Stevens was wrong [Cohn testified] in his "hazy" testimony that, during breakfast at the N.Y. apartment of Schine's parents Sept. 16, McCarthy asked Stevens for a commission for Schine. McCarthy never made such a request in Cohn's presence.[8]

*Sen. A. S. Mike Monroney (D., Okla.), co-author of the Reorg. Act, said May 31 that the act gave McCarthy no right to get unauthorized secret material from Govt. employes. He added that McCarthy repeatedly "usurped" the jurisdiction of other committees as defined in the Reorg. Act.

[See Vol. VI, p. 245K] 1—see p. 174B3 2—p. 159F3 3—p. 183D3 4—p. 45G2 5—p. 183E3 6—p. 136E1-F3 7—p. 138E1 8—p. 138A2

Schine's Assignment. Cohn denied:
- Stevens' testimony that Cohn asked for a N.Y. assignment for Schine Oct. 2.[1] Cohn said Stevens had said he planned to have Schine, after basic training, make a study of "textbooks & other matters" at Army schools.[2]
- That Stevens was asked to give Schine a 2-week furlough for committee work after induction. Cohn said he & Stevens "worked out" an "arrangement" for Schine to "get 2 weeks' temporary duty." McCarthy reconsidered approval of this for fear of "hostile press" criticism. Schine then agreed, at McCarthy's suggestion, to do committee work in spare time "after training."
- Adams' testimony that Cohn asked for cancellation of Schine's 2 weeks in such a way that Schine would not have to report for half a week.[3]
- Steven's testimony that McCarthy Com. people made 65 calls to the Army & took part in 19 meetings with regard to Schine. The figure was excessive unless it included calls to Schine asking him for information.[4]
- That Cohn ever tried to get Schine excused from KP with the possible exception of one occasion when Schine was scheduled for KP on "a non-training day when he was to work on one of these [committee] reports."[5]

Alleged Threats. Cohn acknowledged that he was incensed at being barred from a secret Monmouth laboratory Oct. 20. But he said he did not recall saying "This is war with the Army" or "I have access to FBI files" or "we'll investigate the heck out of you" —remarks attributed to him by Army-side witnesses.[6] Cohn said Harold Rainville & Robert Jones, aides to Sens. Potter & Dirksen, were there and did not remember his using those words. But Cohn did say, in effect, "They let Communists in and they keep us out." Cohn learned that a Soviet military mission had been "shown these things" at Monmouth.

Cohn did not recall an alleged Nov. 1 incident testified to by Adams: Adams' telling Cohn that Schine be "treated just like any other soldier" and Cohn's retorting that "he'd give us 'national interest' " by hearings.[7]

Monmouth Probe. Stevens' testimony about phoning Maj. Gen. Lawton Oct. 2 and ordering cooperation with the McCarthy Com. in the Monmouth inquiry was true "with this qualification" [Cohn testified]: Lawton, who had cooperated, "did not know whether he could make personnel . . . available" to the subcommittee. Lawton said something Cohn did not hear, and Stevens replied, in effect, "Don't give them that."[8]

Stevens was wrong when he testified that the subcommittee Oct. 13 was "ready to discontinue the Ft. Monmouth investigation and turn it back to the Army." Somebody had asked whether the investigation was "to go on forever." McCarthy had replied: "There will be a time when we'll step out and turn it over and you'll have it all to yourselves."[9]

24th Day—June 1

Monmouth Statement Attacked

Cohn testified that McCarthy felt Stevens "had made untrue statements" after seeing Stevens quoted as saying in a press conference Nov. 13 that: (a) "there had been no espionage at Ft. Monmouth"*; (b) none of the Monmouth suspensions were related to the removal of documents. McCarthy "couldn't quite understand" why Stevens had given the press figures on Monmouth suspensions after refusing them to the committee.

Cohn testified that: He did not remember calling Stevens' press conference a "double-cross." When he visited Stevens Nov. 16, at Adams' request, Stevens was "upset" because the press had "distorted" his Nov. 13 remarks. Stevens said "he would like to repudiate everything he had said at the press conference."[10]

Army Testimony Denied

Cohn contradicted Adams' testimony that: (a) McCarthy Com. hearings were moved from New York to Washington because the N.Y. newspaper strike curtailed publicity,[11] (b) on being told Schine would be sent overseas, Cohn said Stevens was "through" as Army Secy. and he [Cohn] would "wreck" the Army.[12]

Cohn refused to label "true" or "false" Adams' testimony that Cohn applied "extreme pressure" to get Schine a N.Y. assignment. He said: Adams never indicated to him that he felt "pressured or abused"; there "never was a request to assign [Schine] to the N.Y. area."[13]

Cohn thought Adams "exaggerated" a minor incident when he testified that Cohn berated him for going over his head to McCarthy, but there was "basis" for Adams' story.[14]

Cohn indicated that Lt. Blount gave a distorted account when he testified that Cohn had threatened Col. Ringler & Capt. Miller, Schine's regimental & company commanders, for making it hard for Schine. Cohn said the discussion was about Schine's availability for committee work. Cohn added that somebody told Schine that Ringler had called the committee's work a "witchhunt." Cohn said he told a committee staff member to check Ringler "because he was talking in a pretty peculiar way about Communist investigations."[15]

Cohn Shows Schine's Work

Cohn produced the material Schine had worked on before & after he went into the Army. Mundt affirmed that informants' names would not be made public. McCarthy insisted, however, that the papers be kept from Army Counsel Welch until he (McCarthy) had gone through them. The material was then given to McCarthy's aides for screening, and Cohn began presenting the papers to the committee piecemeal as they were screened. He was unable to comply with Welch's request that he separate the work Schine had done after his induction.[16]

Cohn identified 11 memoranda which had formed the basis of the McCarthy-Cohn charges against Stevens & Adams. Cohn said he had dictated 4 of them, Carr the others.[17]

McCarthy Vs. Flanders

McCarthy denounced Sen. Ralph E. Flanders (R., Vt.) for a Senate speech that morning (June 1) in which Flanders had said:

> The McCarthy-Army hearing was not going into the "real heart of the mystery," which "concerns the personal relationships" of Schine, Cohn & McCarthy. "Does [Cohn] have some hold on the Senator? Can it be that our 'Dennis the Menace' [McCarthy], so effective in making trouble for his elders, [is in] trouble himself?"
>
> McCarthy was dividing his country, church & party. He drove "his blundering ax deep in the heart of his own [Catholic] church." He tolerated attacks on the Protestant clergy. He inspired "forebodings" in Jews. His "anti-communism so completely parallels that of Adolf Hitler as to strike fear into the hearts of any defenseless minority." He displayed "strange tenderness" toward Nazis convicted of massacring U.S. soldiers at Malmedy in World War II.[18] As a result of McCarthy, the U.S. apparently was being prepared to be taken over by communism: "Citizens are set to spy upon each other; established & responsible government is besmirched; religion is set against religion, race against race. . . . Were [McCarthy] in the pay of the Communists, he could not have done a better job for them."[19]

McCarthy retorted that if Flanders "has any information about the heart of a mystery" he should "take the oath and testify." Accusing Flanders of fomenting "racial & religious bigotry," McCarthy noted that "the 3 top people in our committee" were a Catholic (McCarthy), a Protestant (Carr) & a Jew (Cohn). As for Flanders' charge that McCarthy had started a search for "subversion in the Republican Admin.," McCarthy said that on "the issue of treason, you can't start drawing party lines."

McCarthy Memos Questioned

Welch questioned Mrs. Mary Driscoll, McCarthy's secretary, in an effort to find out whether Cohn's & Carr's memos were authentic.

Mrs. Driscoll testified that she had destroyed her original shorthand notes and did not know which typewriter she had used when she typed the memos. She could not even say that the memos before the subcommittee were the original ones she had typed. She indicated that some might have been copies made for the press.

Welch said he had "the deepest suspicion about the genuineness of these memorandums." He asked Jenkins to have an expert examine them for their authenticity. McCarthy declared that this was tantamount to accusing Mrs. Driscoll of perjury. He demanded that Welch take the stand and give his evidence for such a charge. Welch said he had no evidence "except what has been said in this room."

Jenkins then revealed that several weeks earlier he had asked an FBI man whether examination of the memos by an expert "would be feasible or revealing, and I was given an answer in the negative." Welch said that, in view of this, he could not ask for such an examination.

McCarthy proposed that the truth be found by lie detector tests.

*Most papers quoted Stevens as saying Nov. 13 the Army had found no evidence of "current" espionage at Monmouth. [See Vol. XIII, p. 386E3] 1—see p. 138C2 2—140C2 3—158G2 4—137B1 5—174C1, 173D1, 159B2 6—173E1 7—158B3 8—184B3, 138C2 9—164E1 10—158E3 11—159D1 12—159C2 13—165D1, 159A1 14—159C1 15—173D3 16—186F-G1 17—84B3 18—Vol. IX, p. 162E 19—p. 93A1

Other United States News

Social security coverage (old age & survivors insurance) for 9,000,000 to 10,000,000 persons not covered at present was provided for in an Eisenhower Admin. bill passed, 355-8, by the House June 1. It was sent to the Senate. It provided for increases of at least $5 for single workers and a maximum of $31 for families over present benefits, which ranged from $25 to $168.75 a month. Annual Social Security taxes for employes & employers each would rise by as much as $12 (maximum increase $18 for self-employed) over present annual maximum levels of $72 for employes, $108 for self-employed persons.[1]

7 alleged Communist Party leaders in Connecticut were arrested by the FBI in New Haven, West Hartford & New York May 29 on charges of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. Govt. The arrests brought to 109 the total of such arrests in the U.S. since July 1948. Those held as Connecticut CP conspirators: Simon Silverman (alias Sid Taylor), 38, ex-CP state chairman; Robert C. Ekins, 46, ex-CP state secy.; Jacob Goldring, 39, ex-state CP finance & press director; Alfred Leo Marder, 32, & Joseph Diman, 34, identified as leading CP members in the New Haven area; Sidney Sussman Resnick, 32, state CP youth leader; James Sherman Tate, 43, ex-CP state committee member & organizer in Chicago.[2]

Dr. Ralph J. Bunche's clearance as to loyalty to the U.S. Govt. was announced May 28 by the U.S. Intl. Organizations' Employees' Loyalty Board in New York. It had held a 2-day hearing on Bunche (age 49, UN Trusteeship Div. director) and reportedly heard testimony against him by 2 ex-Communists. The Board's conclusion: "There is no doubt as to the loyalty of Dr. Bunche to the government of the U.S." The board, at work for a year, was reported to have cleared 1,733 American employes of the UN with 162 cases pending.[3]

16 Cuban ex-Govt. officials & a U.S. citizen were indicted June 1 in New York on federal charges of conspiring to export arms from the U.S. to Cuba in violation of the U.S. Neutrality Act. 9 had been indicted on the same charge last December. Among the defendants: Carlos Prío Socarras, 50, Cuban Pres. 1948-52; Carlos Hevia, 54, Pres. in 1933; ex-Sen. Diego Tejera, ex-Interior Min. Segundo Curti Messina & Forrest C. Stowers of New Rochelle, N.Y. At least 10 persons were arrested in Cuba May 26 in a roundup of opposition leaders involved in an alleged "insurrectional" plot.[2]

OBITUARIES

Poultney Bigelow, 98, journalist, world traveler, friend of Kaiser Wilhelm II; May 28, Saugerties, N. Y.

Paul R. Braniff, 56, founder Braniff Airways; June 1, Oklahoma City.

Lionel Conacher, 52, Liberal Canadian MP, ex-hockey star; May 26 in Ottawa of heart attack.

Dr. Fritz O. Laquer, 65, Temple U. biochemist who helped isolate vitamin B-1; May 29, Philadelphia.

Anne O'Hare McCormick, 72, *N.Y. Times* editorialist & writer on world affairs, 1937 Pulitzer Prize winner for foreign correspondence; May 29 in New York of cancer.[4]

Dr. Clarence Paul Oberndorf, 72, psychoanalyst who studied with Freud, ex-pres. Amer. Psychoanalytic Assn.; May 30 in New York.

Robert F. Paine Jr., 44, managing ed. *Memphis Commercial Appeal;* May 26 in Memphis.

Dr. Frank Palmer Speare, 85, founder Northeastern U.; May 29 in Boston.

BUSINESS & FINANCIAL SUMMARY

Week Ended May 29

FINANCE:	This Week	Last Week	Year Ago
U.S. Treasury—			
Monetary gold stocks	*$21,972	*$21,971	*$22,536
Currency circulation	*$29,697	*$29,707	*$29,825
Banks—			
Com'l, ind'l & agri'l loans§	*[a]$21,975	*$22,045	*$22,965
N.Y. bank clearings	$9,377,841,677	$11,387,371,162	$8,358,288,534
England note circulation	*£1,613,419	*£1,609,768	*£1,532,41
N.Y. Stock Exchange—			
Stock sales (shares)	10,728,330	11,151,139	5,842,943
Stock avgs. (100 stocks)**	159.91	159.91	148.26
Bond sales (par value)	$17,574,600	$20,833,000	$15,780,100
Bond avgs. (30 bonds)**	100.51	100.91	95.12
INDUSTRY:			
Auto output (cars, trucks)†	141,830	148,645	113,985
Crude oil (bbls. daily)	[b]6,434,850	6,428,250	6,359,950
Soft-coal output (tons)	[c]7,100,000	6,775,000	9,109,000
Elec. output (kwh.)	*[b]8,373	*8,380	*8,012.902
Carloadings (cars)	[b]681,967	677,581	769,618
	Apr.	Mar.	Apr. 1953
Ind'l output§¶	123	123	136
Steel output (tons)	[r]6,970,937	7,289,600	9,545,538
PRICES:	This Week	Last Week	Year Ago
Wheat (bu.)	$2.62¼	$2.70⅝	$2.49⅛
Corn (bu.)	$1.86¼	$1.86¼	$1.85⅝
Cotton (lb.)	$.354	$.352	$.3405
Steel scrap avg. (ton)	$28.25	$28.08	$38.67
Wholesale food index‡	[d]$7.46	$7.39	$6.47
Weekly whlsl. index (BLS)¶	[d]111.0	111.3	109.8
BUSINESS:			
Dept. store sales§¶	[b]106	97	112
Failures (May 20)‡	248	248	156
	Apr.	Mar.	Apr. 1953
New incorporations‡	10,272	10,514	9,507
LABOR (Census Bur.):			
Employed	60,600,000	60,100,000	61,228,000
Unemployed	3,465,000	3,725,000	1,582,000

*In millions **N.Y. Herald Tribune †Ward's estimate ‡Dun & Bradstreet ¶1947-49=100 §Fed. Reserve Board [a]Member banks, 94 cities, May 19 [b]May 22 [c]May 15 [r]Revised

MISCELLANEOUS

Cheops 'Solar Boat' Found

A solar funerary bark of the Egyptian Pharaoh Cheops* was found intact May 26 in a limestone chamber near the Great Pyramid at Giza. The relic was discovered by Kamal el-Malakh, 34, chief Egyptian Govt. archeologist for the Giza district, who directed the making of an opening in a 150-yd. row of huge limestone blocks unearthed by a roadbuilding crew.

El-Malakh & other archeologists who made preliminary inspections of the bark described it as a luxurious, fully-outfitted wooden ship about 55 yds. long in which Cheop's soul (according to his religious belief) would traverse the heavens in the wake of the sun after death.

Dr. Mustafa Amer, head of the Egyptian Dept. of Antiquities, rated the discovery "above all others in importance" as a relic of ancient Egypt.

Accidents

Death toll in the carrier *Bennington* blast & fire rose to 101 June 2.[5] . . . 15 passengers & 4 crew members were killed May 31 when a DC-3 Nacional Airline plane crashed 60 mi. from Belo Horizante, Brazil. . . . 10 U.S. servicemen were killed when a C-47 Natl. Guard plane crashed in a fog May 31 near Duluth, Minn.

*Pronounced Kee'ops; name spelled Hwfw (Khu'fu) in ancient hieroglyphics. Cheops' reign is usually estimated to have begun about 2,900 B.C., some authorities dating it 1,000 years earlier. According to Herodotus, 5th Century historian, despotic Cheops impressed 100,000-man shifts, each working 3 months at a time, into 20-yr. labor of building largest pyramid as his tomb & monument. 1—see pp. 130B3, 28D2 2—p. 62A2 3—pp. 67A2, 46C1 4—Vol. X, 335F 5—p. 176A2 6—p. 96B2

Married: Actor Kirk Douglas, 37, to French publicist Anne Buydens, 31; May 29 in Las Vegas (2d for both). . . . Actress Jean Peters, 25, to oilman Stuart W. Cramer 3d, 26, of Mineral Wells, Tex.; May 29 in Washington.

SPORTS

Winners

Indianapolis Speedway. Bill Vukovich, 35, of Fresno, Calif. won the annual 500-mi. Indianapolis Speedway auto race for the 2d successive year May 31, earning $74,934.84 of the record $269,375 purse. He drove a Fuel Injection Special at an average speed of 130.84 mph. (elapsed time of 3 hr. 52 min. 41.88 sec.), a new record for the event.

Golf. British men's amateur title in Muirfield, Scotland: won May 29 by Doug Bachli, 32, of Rosebud, Victoria (Australia), 2 & 1 over Bill Campbell of Huntington, W. Va. . . . $25,000 Colonial Natl. invitation tourney in Fort Worth, Tex.: won May 30 by Johnny Palmer, 35, of Charlotte, N.C., for $5,000.

Track. College championships May 29: IC4A outdoor in New York—Penn State; Big 10 outdoor in Lafayette, Ind.—Illinois.

•

Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (D., Colo.) said May 26 he had dropped his legislative campaign to make baseball clubs owned by business firms subject to anti-trust laws.[6]